The result follows from applying the partitioned least squares formula to this expression.
For part (ii), note that, under Assumptions 1 and 2, Assumption 1 will also hold with x √ JT * 2J ) to show that this quantity converges in distribution (and in probability) to a limiting distribution that can be seen to be identically zero.
Q.E.D. Thus, it suffices to show that s 2 j (δ ζ) dP ζ (ζ) s j (δ ζ) dP ζ (ζ) converges to zero more quickly than 1/ √ J uniformly over 1 ≤ j ≤ J. To this end, we prove the following lemma.
LEMMA 1: Suppose that, for some constants B J and A J , |ξ j | ≤ A J , |p j | ≤ A J and x j ≤ B J for all j, and that the tails of ζ are bounded by the tails of a normal variable. Then, for some constant C, exp −2B J β + ζ dP ζ (ζ)
The result follows since the integral in the denominator is bounded from below by exp(−2 · B J · K) · P ζ ( ζ ≤ K) ≥ exp(−2 · B J · K) · (1/2) for large enough K, and the numerator is bounded from above by a constant times K exp(KB 2 J ) for large enough K.
Q.E.D.
The bound in Lemma 1 will decrease more quickly than 1/ √ J as long as A J / log J → 0 and B 2 J / log J → 0. For the bounds on the primitives x j , ξ j , and MC j , this follows easily from the bounds on tail probabilities, as shown in the next lemma. For the bound on prices, a more involved argument is needed, which constitutes the remainder of the proof.
LEMMA 2: Let {u j } J j=1 be a sequence of random variables such that P(u j ≥ t) ≤ C exp(−t γ /C) for some γ and C that do not depend on j. Then, for any ε > 0, P max It follows from Lemma 2 that all of the conditions of Lemma 1, except for the bound on price, hold with probability 1 for A J = C(log J) 1−ε and B J = C(log J) 1/2−ε for C large enough and ε small enough. To prove the theorem, it suffices to show that max 1≤j≤J |p j | is also bounded by A J for C large enough and ε small enough. This follows from the next two lemmas.
LEMMA 3: Suppose that, for some K J , exp g j (ζ) s j (δ ζ) dP ζ (ζ)
of the terms in the denominator is the outside good, with utility 0. Thus,
where the inequalities follow since t/(1 − t) is increasing in t for 0 ≤ t < 1.
giving the desired bound.
LEMMA 4: For some constant C,
where the last inequality follows from Jensen's inequality applied to k a k exp(g k (ζ)). We have, for each j and k,
Since the tails of ζ are bounded by the tails of a normal variable, this is bounded, for some constant C, by
By making C larger, this can be bounded by C exp(C max{ x j
for large enough C. Thus, (6) can be bounded by
The result follows by redefining C.
Putting these lemmas together, it follows that, for some constant C 1 ,
From this and Lemma 2, it follows that, for C 2 large enough and ε > 0 small enough, the conditions of Lemma 1 hold with A J = C 2 (log J) 1−ε and B J = (log J) 1/2−ε with probability approaching 1, giving the desired result.
where R J is a vector with the first d x rows equal to zero, and the remaining d h rows given by
dimension of x j and d h is the dimension ofh(x k )). The first term in the display converges to a normal variable with mean zero and variance To verify Assumption 4, it suffices to show max j |p j − p * j | p → 0. Arguing as in Konovalov and Sandor (2010) , it can be seen that equation (5) has a unique solution, and defines b as a R F -valued function that is continuous at (π 0 μ r 0 π 1 μ r 1 π F μ r F ) (where π 0 = lim n→∞π0 = lim n→∞ 1/J = 0). The difference between p j and p * j can then be written as, for f the firm producing product j, b f (π 0 μ r 0 π 1 μ r 1 π F μ r F ) − b f (π 0r0 π 1r1 π FrF ), which converges in probability to zero by the law of large numbers and the continuous mapping theorem. Since max j |p j −p *
π FrF )| and the number of firms does not increase with J, the result follows.
A.4. Proof of Theorem 4
The following notation is used throughout this section. Let d z = d x + d h (where d x and d h are the dimensions of x i j and h(x i j ), respectively). Define
. Let w i j be the nonconstant part of x i j so that x i j = (1 w i j ) and let μ h = Eh(x i j ) μ r = E(r i j ), μ xr = E(x i j r i j ), and μ wr = E(w i j r i j ). For an n × m matrix M with i jth entry M i j , vec(M) is the vectorization of M given by the ij × 1 vec-
is the k × k matrix with all off diagonal elements equal to zero and j × jth entry given by the jth element of a. The notation 0 a×b and 1 a×b is used to denote an a × b matrix of 0's and 1's, respectively, with the subscript being dropped in cases where the dimension of the matrix of 0's or 1's is clear from the context.
It will be useful to define some additional quantities to describe the asymptotic distribution. Let
and let u i j = ξ i j (x i j μ h ) . Let Σ W u be the variance matrix of (vec(W i j ) u i j ) and let Σ W u be defined by starting with Σ W u and multiplying diagonal elements
(those corresponding to the last d h rows of W i j and u i j ) by m 3 ∞ , and multiplying off diagonal elements in these rows and columns by m 2 ∞ . Define
and let K m 2 ∞ be defined in the same way, but with m 2 ∞ replacingm 2 . Let
for any positive real number q. Let
Note that A −1 q = A 1/q and, with the above notation,M 1 = Km 2 M 1 H. To describe the asymptotic distribution, let Z zξ be a random vector on R dz and let Z zx be a random d z × (d x + 1) matrix, defined on the same probability space such that (vec (Z zx 
(note that Q is full rank if and only if (iff) m 2 ∞ = 1, so that this matrix is full rank under the conditions of the theorem). In the case where N/J → ∞, we will show that
In the case where N/J → c for some finite constant c, we will show that
We first prove the following lemma.
LEMMA 5: Under the conditions of Theorem 4,
is bounded uniformly over i as N and the J i 's increase.
PROOF: First, note that
From this formula and the fact that one of the terms in the denominator is the outside good with mean utility zero, it follows that 0
, so that prices are bounded uniformly over i and j. From this and the boundedness of x i j and ξ i j , it follows that 0 ≤ p i j − MC i j − 1/α ≤ C/(J i α) for C large enough.
Substituting this bound back into (7), we see that (7) is bounded from above by
and from below by 1 α
Using the fact that, for a constant C 1 that depends only on C, exp(C/J i )
Thus,
wherer and r are positive upper and lower bounds for r i j (which exist by boundedness of x i j , ξ i j , and MC i j ). The result now follows by using the triangle inequality and noting that
This result is used in the following lemmas, which concern the sample means involved in the IV estimator.
LEMMA 6: Under the conditions of Theorem
The term that is claimed to be o P (1) is given bȳ
The last term goes to zero, since it is bounded by
| (where the existence of such a bound follows from Lemma 5). Using Lemma 5, the first term in (8) is equal to
where R i j is the remainder term in Lemma 5. This converges to zero since R i k is bounded and
→ μ h by the law of large numbers.
Q.E.D.
LEMMA 7: Under the conditions of Theorem
where R i j is the quantity in Lemma 5. The last term is bounded by a constant times
, which goes to zero under the conditions of Theorem 4. For the first term, we have
The second term has mean zero and variance
var(x i j r i j /(αμ r )), which goes to zero as N → ∞, and the last term is equal to
By boundedness of x i j and r i j , this is bounded by a constant times
k=1 r i k |, which converges in probability to zero since, by Hölder's inequality, 
The first term is equal to (m 2 − 1/J)μ h μ v =m 2 μ h μ v . The second term is equal to the second term in (9) minus
, which is O P (1/(J NJ)) = o P (1/ NJ) by the central limit theorem. The last term in (10) has mean zero and variance given by
For each i, all of the terms in the above summand are zero except for those where either j = and k = m or j = m and k = . The number of such terms is bounded by a constant times J 2 i , so that the above display is bounded by a constant times
Thus, the last term in (10) converges to zero at a 1/ NJ 2 rate, which is strictly faster than 1/ NJ, as claimed.
LEMMA 9: Under the conditions of Theorem 4,
whereM 1 is defined at the beginning of this section and (vec(V JN ) (
to a normal distribution with variance Σ W u (where Σ W u is defined at the beginning of this section).
PROOF: It follows from Lemma 8 that (vec(V JN ) (
where W i j and u i j are defined at the beginning of this section and, for any scalar r, B r is defined to be the d z × d z diagonal matrix with 1's in the first d x diagonal entries and r in the remaining diagonal entries. By a central limit theorem for triangular arrays of independent nonidentically distributed variables, this converges to a normal distribution with variance
which can be seen to be equal to Σ W u by inspection. (To verify Lindeberg's condition for the terms of the form (J i /J)v i j for a random variable v i j , it suffices to show that
Putting the above lemmas together and using the fact thatM 1 = Km 2 M 1 H, we haveM
where V JN is given in Lemma 9. Since the last column of M 1 is all 0's,
where Q is the deterministic matrix and Z zξ is the random vector defined at the beginning of the proof. In the case where N/J → c for a finite constant c,
is normal with mean zero and variance matrix Σ W u as defined at the beginning of the proof. Note thatẐ zξ and V JN converge in distribution jointly to Z zξ and Z zx by Lemma 9.) Thus,
, and this limiting distribution is the same as if the markup were equal to 1/α (by the same arguments, but with M 2 a matrix of zeros).
B. ADDITIONAL LARGE MARKET ASYMPTOTIC RESULTS
This section gives the formal results described in Section 3.2 for the nested logit model, and discusses large market asymptotics for the vertical model, and for some of the cases considered in the main text under multi-product firms.
B.1. Nested Logit
In the nested logit model, the J products are split into G mutually exclusive groups. Here, the number of groups G will increase, while the number of products per group stays fixed. As in Section 3.1, this section considers single product firms, although the results will be similar for multi-product firms as long as the number of firms increases rather than the number of products per firm. The set of products in a given group g ∈ {1 G} is denoted by
J}. The share of product j as a fraction of its group g is denoted bys j/g (x p ξ), and the share of group g as a fraction of all products is given bys g (x p ξ). Consumer i's utility for good j is
where ζ ig is a random coefficient on a dummy variable for group g and ε ij is still extreme value. The distribution of ζ ig depends on σ and is such that ζ ig + (1 − σ)ε ij is extreme value. This leads to the formulass j/g = exp(δ j /(1−σ))
for shares where D g = j∈Jg exp(δ j /(1 − σ)). These can be inverted to get log s j − log s 0 = x j β − αp j + σ logs j/g + ξ j (11) (here, the outside good, product 0, has mean utility normalized to zero and is the only product in its nest). The derivative of j's share with respect to j's price is ds j dp j = −α 1−σ s j (1 − σs j/g − (1 − σ)s j ), which gives a markup of
If the number of nests increases with the number of products per nest fixed, s j will go to zero. Thus, we might expect that prices converge to the solution to a limiting system of equations where s j is removed from the right hand side of (12). Sinces j/g depends only on products in group g, this would mean that asymptotic markups are determined by a pricing game involving only firms with products in the same group. To formalize this, let p * j for j in group j be defined as the unique solution to the system of equations
and lets * j/g =s j/g (x p * ξ). That is, p * j is defined as the solution to a system of equations given by the markup formula (12), but with s j set to its limiting value of 0. The following theorem states that IV estimates in this model are asymptotically equivalent to the estimates that would be obtained if prices were replaced with p * j . Since prices in the limiting model depend on characteristics of products in the same nest but not on characteristics of products in other nests, this means that characteristics of products in the same nest will potentially have identifying power, while products in other nests will not.
THEOREM 7:
In the nested logit model single product firms and many nests, suppose that (x j ξ j MC j ) is bounded and i.i.d. across j. Let z j = (x j h({x k } k∈J g−L {x k } k∈J g+M )) for j ∈ J g for some function h with finite variance. Let p * j ands * j/g be defined in (13). Let (α β σ) be the IV estimates defined in (4), and let (α * β * σ * ) be defined in the same way, but with p * j ands * j/g replacing p j ands j/g . Then (α β σ) − (α * β * σ * ) p → 0 and, if (α * β * σ * ) is consistent and asymptotically normal, (α β σ) will also be consistent and asymptotically normal, with the same asymptotic distribution.
Note that if we had taken the number of nests fixed with the number of products per nest increasing, boths j/g and s j would converge to zero in the markup formula (12), and the markup would converge to a constant as with the results in Section 3.1. Thus, if the dimension of ζ is fixed, we obtain the same results as in Section 3.1 (with the stronger result for the nested logit model that σ −σ * p → 0, where both estimates are inconsistent). The proof of Theorem 7 is given below. PROOF OF THEOREM 7: As before, it suffices to show that p j and, in this case, s j/g converge uniformly to the starred versions at a faster than 1/ √ J rate. Define the function f by f j (p x ξ MC r)
Then p * g satisfies f (p * g x g ξ g MC g 0) = 0 and any solution p to the Nash pricing equations satisfies f (p * g x g ξ g MC g r) = 0 for
where the functions s j ands j/g take prices and product characteristics to the expressions for nested logit shares defined earlier in the section.
The proof proceeds by first showing that √ J max j≤Jrj converges to zero, and then using the implicit function theorem and the mean value theorem to get a linear approximation to the p that solves f (p x ξ MC r) = 0 as a function of r. The first statement follows since
so that √ J max j≤Jrj will converge to zero as long as √ J max j≤J s j converges to zero. Inspection of the formula for s j shows that this will hold as long as equilibrium prices are bounded.
For r small, the equation f (p x ξ MC r) = 0 has a unique solution for p. To see that a solution exists, note that this equation is equivalent to the first order condition for setting prices in the Bertrand pricing game with demand given by q j (p) ≡ exp((x j β − αp j )/(1 − σ))/D σ g and marginal cost equal to MC j + r j . An equilibrium exists in this game, since it is log supermodular (see pp. 151-152 of Vives (2001)):
Uniqueness follows from verifying a dominant diagonal condition for f (see p. 47 of Vives (2001)). We have
and, for k = j,
Since a unique p solves f (p x ξ MC r) = 0 for the elements of (x ξ MC) in the given bounded set and r close to zero, this defines p as a function φ(x ξ MC r) of the remaining variables. By the implicit function theorem, the derivative matrix Dφ(x ξ MC r) of φ is given by where subscripts denote blocks of the derivative matrix corresponding to derivatives with respect to given variables (the derivative matrix of f with respect to p is invertible since it is diagonally dominant). Since p = φ(x ξ MC r) and p * = φ(x ξ MC 0), by the mean value theorem, for every index j, there is ar between 0 andr such the difference between p j and p * j is given by the jth row of
Since the elements of (D p f (φ(x ξ MC r) x ξ MC r)) −1 D r f (φ(x ξ MC r) x ξ MC r) are continuous functions of x, ξ, MC, and r, the function that maps t to the maximum of the absolute values of the elements of this matrix times t takes a maximum M as x, ξ, MC, and r range over the compact set that contains them and t ranges over the unit sphere in R |Jg| . This gives
The rate of uniform convergence fors j/g follows sinces j/g is equal tos * j/g with p * k replaced by p k in the definition, and the formula in the definition has a derivative with respect to the vector of prices in group g that is bounded in an open set containing all values of (x ξ MC p) that can be taken under the assumptions of the theorem. Thus, by the mean value theorem, for some finite B, √ J max j≤J |s *
B.2. Vertical Model
In contrast to the other models in which consumers have an idiosyncratic preference term ε ij for each item, consider a model in which consumers agree on the ranking of goods, but differ in their willingness to pay for product quality, as in Bresnahan (1987) . As with the random coefficients logit results in Section 3.1, the identifying power of characteristics of other products as instruments for price goes to zero at a faster than 1/ √ J rate.
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Utility of an individual consumer is given by
where ζ ip represents consumer i's preference for product quality. A small value of ζ ip means that consumer i has a high value for the quality of the inside goods relative to the numeraire good. The outsize good 0 has p 0 = 0 and δ 0 normalized to 0. Arrange the goods in order of product quality so that δ 1 < · · · < δ J . If all products have positive market share, this will imply that prices satisfy p 1 < · · · < p J as well. Consumer i will prefer good j to j − 1 if
Combining this with the expression for j + 1, consumer i will prefer j to its neighbors if Δ j > ζ ip > Δ j+1 . For all products to have positive market share, this must hold for some ζ ip for all j, so we must have Δ 1 > · · · > Δ J . If this is the case, consumers who prefer j to its neighbors will also prefer j to all other products, so, letting F be the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of ζ ip , market shares will be given by
If we define Δ 0 = ∞ and Δ J+1 = −∞, this will hold for good J and the outside good 0 as well.
This can be inverted to give
If F is known, this equation can be estimated using OLS (indeed, Bresnahan (1987) , treats F as known and fixes F when estimating a version of this model). If F is allowed to depend on an unknown parameter (as in, e.g., Berry and Pakes (2007) ), more instruments will be needed, so it will be useful to study the identifying power of moment conditions based on characteristics of other products (note, however, that, unless the parameter enters linearly into (15), the inconsistency results in this paper will not apply, and additional arguments will be needed).
Differentiating the formula for shares with respect to p j gives, letting f be the probability density function (p.d.f.) of ζ ip , ds j dp
This gives markups in an interior Bertrand equilibrium as
Suppose that, for some ζ > 0, ζ ≤ ζ ip for all consumers. That is, willingness to pay for product quality is bounded from above. In this case, if all products have positive market share, we will have Δ j > ζ for all j. Thus, the denominator in (16) will be bounded from below as J increases, so if market shares all converge to zero, markups will converge to zero at the same rate or faster. If firms have approximately equal market shares asymptotically, they will converge to zero at a 1/J rate, fast enough for Theorem 5 to hold.
One set of primitive conditions under which markups will converge to zero at a fast rate is the following. In addition to assuming that ζ ip is bounded from below, suppose that the density f of the random coefficient is bounded from above by f and from below by f . Suppose that product characteristics are added in such a way that √ J max j≤J δ j − δ j−1 → 0 (e.g., this holds with probability 1 by results in Devroye (1981) , for the case where the δ j 's are order statistics of the uniform distribution or, by a quantile transformation, any distribution with finite support and continuous density bounded from above and below) and that all products have positive market share in equilibrium. Then
(the last inequality follows by bounding the denominator from below by f
). For product j to have positive market share, we must have
We note that, while the above conditions lead to markups quickly decreasing, the results may be different if the support of product characteristics or the distribution of the random coefficient changes with J. We leave these questions for future research.
B.3. Multi-Product Firms
This section considers the case with many small multi-product firms. If the number of products sold by each firm is fixed and the number of firms grows large, the results are similar to the single product case, although, due to the difficulty of proving existence and uniqueness of equilibrium for these models with multi-product firms, these results place some conditions directly on equilibrium prices. In particular, these results require prices to be bounded as the number of products increases, and the nested logit model requires the existence of an equilibrium in a limiting form of the game in which price is a differentiable function of costs and characteristics.
For the logit model, we have Substituting this into the first order conditions for p j (equation (1)) and dividing by −αs j gives
Assuming that prices and product characteristics are bounded as J increases, shares will go to zero at a faster than 1/ √ J rate. In this case, markups will converge to 1/α at a faster than 1/ √ J rate, as in the single product case. For the nested logit model, it can be checked that, for k = j and k and j in the same nest, ∂s k /∂p j = α 1−σ s k (σs j/g + (1 − σ)s j ). For k in some other nest , we have ∂s k /∂p j = αs k s j . Plugging these into the first order conditions for firm f setting p j gives
Rearranging gives
This can be written-forr J a term that converges to zero at faster than a 1/ √ J rate as long as prices and product characteristics are bounded as J increases-as
If this system of equations has a unique solution, and the function that takes marginal costs and product characteristics of nest g and the remainder term to the vector of prices for nest g that solves this system of equations for nest g has an invertible derivative for marginal costs and product characteristics in a compact set that contains them by assumption, then an argument similar to that used for Theorem 7 will show that prices in the nested logit game converge uniformly at a faster than 1/ √ J rate to those that solve these equations. As with the single product firm case, equilibrium prices do not depend on characteristics of goods in other nests asymptotically. This holds even for products in other nests owned by the same firm.
In the full random coefficients model with multi-product firms, the first order conditions for product j are
This can be rearranged to give
If prices are bounded and the assumptions of Theorem 2 hold, the left hand side will converge to (p j − MC j ) at faster than a 1/ √ J rate. Assuming prices are bounded, the first term on the right hand side is bounded by a constant times
. This term goes to zero at the required rate using the same argument as for
.
C. MONTE CARLO
This section reports additional details and summary statistics for the Monte Carlos, as well as results for designs not reported in the main text. These results include a comparison to the case where markups are taken to be constant, which gives an idea of how well the conclusion of Theorem 1 regarding large J asymptotics describes the given combinations of N and J for these data generating processes (see Section C.3).
C.1. Details for the Monte Carlo Designs
For the Monte Carlos with more than one market, the BLP instruments are formed by taking the excluded instruments for product j in market i, produced by firm f , to be k∈F f x i k and J i k=1 x i k . For the Monte Carlos with BLP instruments in a single market, J i k=1 x i k is constant, so the excluded instruments are formed as k∈F f x i k and ( k∈F f x i k )
2 . For the Monte Carlos with cost shifter instruments, the excluded instruments are z i j and z 2 i j . For the Monte Carlos where prices are generated from constant markups, the form of the instruments is the same (in particular, one of the BLP instruments is still k∈F f x i k even though the ownership structure that defines F f does not affect prices). Note that, in all cases, the number of moment conditions is equal to the number of parameters, so the estimator does not depend on the form of the weighting matrix W . All of the Monte Carlo results use 1000 Monte Carlo replications. For a small number of Monte Carlo draws, the equation solver did not converge to a solution for equilibrium prices or the estimator did not converge, and these were discarded.
The share function and inverse share function were computed by Monte Carlo integration with 10 draws of the random coefficients, with the same draws used to generate shares and to compute the inverse share function. Since the same Monte Carlo draws are used in both cases, there is no simulation error from Monte Carlo integration if we consider the random coefficients to be drawn from a discrete distribution with 10 points.
The last two columns report rejection probabilities for a two-sided test for the price coefficient α at its true value and for testing α = 0. Note that the second to last column, which gives the rejection probability at the true value of α, is a lower bound for the size of the test, since the size of the test is the supremum of this rejection probability over all possible values of other parameters (correlation between cost shocks and demand shocks, etc.).
C.2. Additional Summary Statistics and Monte Carlo Designs
In addition to the Monte Carlos with 10 products per firm, I perform Monte Carlos with 2 products per firm, and with firm size varying between 2 products in approximately 1/3 of the markets, 5 products in 1/3 of the markets, and 10 products per firm in the remaining markets. More precisely, the number of products per firm and the number of products per market for the cases where one or both of these is varied is given as follows. For the cases with 3 markets and the number of products per market varied, the vector of market sizes is (20 60 100). For the cases with 20 markets and the number of products per market varied, 7 markets have 20 products, another 7 markets have 60 products, and the remaining 6 markets have 100 products. For the case with 3 markets where the number of products per firm varies, the vector of firm sizes is (2 5 10). For the case with 20 markets and firm size varied, 7 markets have 2 products per firm, another 7 have 5 products per firm, and the remaining 6 have 10 products per firm. For the case with 3 markets where both products per market and products per firm vary, one market has 20 products with 5 products per firm, the second market has 60 products with 10 products per firm, and the remaining market has 100 products and 2 products per firm. For the case with 20 markets where both products per market and products per firm vary, 4 markets have 20 products with 2 products per firm, 3 markets have 20 products with 5 products per firm, 4 markets have 60 products with 5 products per firm, 3 markets have 60 products with 10 products per firm, 3 markets have 100 products with 10 products per firm, and the remaining 3 markets have 100 products with 2 products per firm.
These results are reported in Tables IV and V . These tables contain the results from the designs in the main text as well. In addition to the statistics reported in the main text, I also report mean bias and mean absolute deviation from the true value (as opposed to median bias and median absolute deviation, which are reported here as well). Since these estimators are known not to have first moments in similar settings, it may be the case that these quantities are undefined for some of these designs. This may explain some of the erratic behavior of the mean bias and mean absolute deviation as estimated by the Monte Carlos (for example, in the fourth row of Table IV) . Given the possible lack of moments of the estimators for these designs, care must be taken in interpreting the columns corresponding to mean bias and mean absolute deviation. On the other hand, poor performance in terms of median bias and median absolute deviation can be interpreted as evidence that the estimators perform poorly.
C.3. When Is the Single Large Market Limiting Model a Good Approximation?
The results of Section 3.1 show that, under asymptotics where the number of products increases with firm size and the number of markets fixed, IV estima-tors do no better than they would with constant markups. To address how well this limiting model approximates Bertrand equilibrium with the Monte Carlo data generating processes used in this section, I simulate from the same data generating process for x, ξ, and MC used in Tables IV and V (which subsume  Tables I and III in the main text, but contain results for additional data generating processes as described above), but set markups to 1/α for all products and compare estimates based on these data sets to the previously reported estimates computed from data sets with Bertrand prices. The results show that, while the limiting model gives a pessimistic description of the behavior of BLP instrument-based estimates for some of the cases considered, in other cases it is accurate enough that one would worry about applying the BLP instruments. With a single market, BLP instruments do not appear to perform noticeably better under Bertrand pricing than in the limiting model in any of the Monte Carlo designs. With 3 markets, 10 products per firm, and 100 products, the median bias and median absolute deviation of the estimate of α are only slightly better in the true model than they are with a constant markup, and the size distortion in the two-sided test for α is actually worse. As seen in Table II , the results can be equally bad with 20 markets and 100 products, depending on the ownership structure and coefficient of x in the demand specification.
